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An experiment about inattention blindness was conducted within the context of an art
exhibition as opposed to a laboratory context in order to investigate the potential of art as
a vehicle to study attention and its disorders. The project utilized a ﬂash animation, Steal-
ing Attention, that was modeled after the movie by Simons and Chabris (1999) but with
signiﬁcant experimental differences, involving context and staging, the emotional salience
of the objects depicted, and the prior art viewing experience of participants. The study
involved two components: observing if viewers watching an animation in a gallery could
be distracted from noticing the disappearance of stolen museum antiquities (the targets)
by the overlaid ﬂashing images of a card game (the distractors) and then observingwhether
repetition of the depicted targets throughout the gallery installation could facilitate a re-
direction of attention that allowed viewers to perceive the targets not initially noted in the
animation. My ﬁndings were that, after viewing the entire installation and then re-viewing
the animation, 64% of the viewers who did not initially remark on the targets in the ani-
mation were then able to see them.The discussion elaborates on these ﬁndings and then
considers ways in which the implications of inattention blindness paradigms might be more
fully rendered by uniting insights from the two disciplines of art and neuroscience than by
either alone.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years considerable literature has been published on atten-
tion by art historians, historians of science, and philosophers in
addition to neuroscientists (e.g., Baxandall, 1995; Crary, 1999;
Hagner, 2003; Rollins, 2004; Stafford, 2007). They have made
important contributions that speciﬁcally highlight attention in
relationship to art, and their insights have informed our under-
standing of the attentional system. The fact that art, itself, is
constitutive of attentional phenomena suggests why it should hold
special interest for neuroscientists. My perspective as an artist
has allowed me to locate a point of entry into this rich histori-
cal research through exploring inattention blindness, which is the
intriguing phenomenon of not being able to see things in plain
sight (Mack and Rock, 1998). This paper examines my art exper-
iment, including its challenges and implications. It also explores
the possibility that certain artworks, when engaged, can serve as
an attentional training ground.
After introducing the topic of inattention blindness, I describe
examples of its exploration in several scientiﬁc studies. I then relay
my own experience in staging an experiment about this phenom-
enon in an art gallery, including methods, results, and possible
confounds. The attentional system and ability to focus are sub-
sequently considered within a broad context of learning. This is
followed by a discussion of inattention blindness in art history
and then by an analysis of some of the related neuroscience, such
as the ability to make attention switches. Finally, I consider why
†An abbreviated, earlier version of “An Artistic Exploration of Inattention Blindness” was
published by Technoetic Arts: A Journal of Speculative Research, 8, 93–99 in 2010.
inattention blindness can be more fully rendered through uniting
insights from multiple disciplines.
INATTENTION BLINDNESS
The phenomenon of inattention blindness or, more formally,
“inattentional blindness” as coined by psychologists Mack and
Rock (1998) has been examined by scientists for several decades.
Inattention blindness is related to other phenomena, such as the
“attentional blink” (the failure to detect a second salient target
occurring in succession after the ﬁrst target) and “change blind-
ness” (the inability of our visual system to detect alterations to
something staring us straight in the face); all engage similar prin-
ciples although change blindness also involves memory. A variety
of methods are used by neuroscientists to accomplish the visual
disruption; they may insert a blank screen or use a “ﬂicker,” a
“blink,” or diverters like “mudsplashes.” A variety of tools can
implement the disruption, including stereoscopes, visual masking,
and dichoptic methods. Using dynamic visual displays, a series of
studies of inattention blindness were conducted in the 1970s and
1980s during which observers were asked to report on a task. As a
result of the assignment, viewers often did not notice staged events,
causing neuroscientists to conclude that people only remember
those objects that receive their focused attention.
Other factors play a role in inattention blindness; cultural
bias regarding what is noticed is, in itself, a whole area subject
to extended study as are pre-attentive processes. Repeated trials
appear to make a difference with respect to perception. Vision sci-
entists Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) reported that in search
for a singleton target, when the unique feature varies randomly
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from trial to trial the deployment of focal visual attention is faster
when the target feature is the same as in past trials than when it
is different, a phenomenon called priming of pop out. (Note that
the term, pop out, as used here differs from its use in commonly
used pop out ads on the internet. Clearly advertisers bank on
the phenomenon of subliminal priming). Performance was also
enhanced when the target occupied the same spatial position on
consecutive trials (Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1996). However, psy-
chologists Treisman and DeSchepper (1996) found that ignoring
a distractor on one trial made it easier to ignore the same item
on subsequent trials. Inattention blindness has been explored by
Neisser and Becklen (1975),Mack and Rock (1998), and expanded
upon by psychologists, Simons and Chabris (1999), among others.
In the latter’s well known study, “Gorillas in our midst: sustained
inattentional blindness for dynamic events,” a movie sequence of
a complex basketball scene was shown to observers who were
directed to count the number of ball exchanges made in a ball
game. During the movie, few viewers noticed that an actor dressed
in a gorilla suit walked through the scene. On the basis of their
results, Simons and Chabris suggested that the likelihood of notic-
ing an unexpected object depends on the similarity of that object
to other objects in the display and on the difﬁculty of the priming
monitoring task. They further concluded that observers attend to
objects and events; the spatial proximity of the critical unattended
object to attended locations did not appear to inﬂuence detection.
STAGING INATTENTION BLINDNESS IN AN ART GALLERY
To study inattention blindness in the context of an art exhibi-
tion, I utilized an animation that resulted from my collaboration
with Michael E. Goldberg, Director of the Mahoney Center for
Brain and Behavior,Columbia University,NYC. My study involved
two components: observing if viewers watching an animation in a
gallery could be distracted from noticing the disappearance of
stolen museum antiquities (the targets) by the overlaid ﬂash-
ing images of a card game (the distractors) and then observing
whether repetition of the depicted targets throughout the gallery
installation could facilitate an“attention switch”that allowed view-
ers to perceive the targets not initially noted in the animationwhen
re-viewing it again. The reasoning was that the informal “learn-
ing” taking place through contextual cueing might cause viewers
to recognize the overlooked targets.
I became especially interested as an artist in the boundary
between normality and pathology. Part of my motivation was
to test ﬁrst-hand whether the embodied knowledge of images,
emotion, and social context that is deeply embedded in art prac-
tices is capable of supplementing neuroscience’s understanding of
attention and its disorders. Part of the controversy over the diag-
nosis of attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) involves
determining whether ADHD symptoms such as distraction fall
within the bounds of normal perception. The construction of an
installation and collaborative animation allowed participants to
experience the constraints on the attentional system. Showing the
animation within the experimental context of a gallery setting
provided a way for viewers to experience a common failure of
perception along with an opportunity to reﬂect upon this experi-
ence. The project raised four questions: (1) What does attention
make possible? (2) Can attention be shifted? (3) Does art training
help prevent distraction? and (4) Can art train attention? My ﬁnd-
ings showed that, after viewing the entire installation and then
re-viewing the animation, 64% of the viewers who did not ini-
tially remark on the targets in the animation were then able to see
them. I have used the term“remark” rather than “see” because it is
possible that pre-attentive viewing had occurred but had not yet
been brought to conscious awareness. I discuss the implications of
these results with regard to my premise that art offers a training
system for the attentional system.
Images of looted Iraqi antiquities were programmed to grad-
ually disappear over the course of a 3-min animation, and the
distraction of viewing hands with ﬂashing cards made them hard
to discern (Figure 1). A directive was issued at the onset of the
animation to “count the number of times the Queen of Hearts
appears.” After one playing, viewers were questioned about what
they had observed; thosewhodid not see the targets were invited to
walk around the gallery and then re-view the animation. The aim
was to assess whether the repetition of images of looted objects
throughout the gallery in static displays could cause the targets to
become more salient and result in viewers redirecting their vision
from the foreground to the background of the animation.
The design of my own artistic study was different from the sci-
entiﬁc studies just considered.As far as I amaware, art experiments
are seldom conducted that have explored inattention blindness.
In addition, psychophysical tests are not frequently conducted
in settings apart from laboratories, and I wanted to determine
if a gallery had any advantages over these situations. In fact, sci-
entists, themselves, are increasingly investigating the operations
of vision under more natural conditions. As an early example,
Neisser (1982) demonstrated the value of studying animals under
naturalistic conditions. Unlike such experiments, however, my art
installation, Stealing Attention, constituted a far from neutral test.
It referenced the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and conceivably aroused
some of the strong emotions manyAmericans felt in being led into
FIGURE 1 | An animation overlay of images of hands playing
“three-card monte” (http://www.complexityart.com/subs/images/
flash/stealing_attention_feldman.mov).
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war on amisleading premise. The gallery exhibition broadened the
parameters of objective scientiﬁc testing in that the art encouraged
viewers to identify emotionally with the loss of the Iraqi heritage
signiﬁed by the looting of antiquities.
The distractors in my art experiment were hands with cards
that ﬂashed rapidly and were intended to symbolize the game
Three-Card Monte. This game is directly in line with other con
games in which the card dealer’s rapid hand movements keep the
person placing the bet from noticing the removal of the winning
card. I based some of my images in the animation and throughout
the entire installation on works by Caravaggio and Georges de la
Tour that dealt with the theme of card thefts. These are images well
known to artists and art historians. Many museum goers will recall
the mid-sixteenth century work titled The Conjuror, by Hierony-
mus Bosch, which is a study of distraction related to Three-Card
Monte. As Macknik et al. (2008) pointed out, in Bosch’s artwork
the magician performs the shell game for a crowd in medieval
Europe, while pickpockets steal the belongings of the distracted
spectators.
In psychological parlance, the hand movements of the card
dealer in our animationwere“distractors”intended to direct atten-
tion away from the “critical stimulus” or true targets (the removal
of antiquities). The animation symbolically linked the Iraqi inva-
sion and stolen antiquities with the Bush administration’s own
hidden objectives. In my interpretation, the administration’s false
claims of weapons of mass destruction were meant to distract the
public from the real targets of invading Iraq and toppling Saddam
Hussein. Nevertheless, I underestimated the difﬁculty of choos-
ing a disappearing, partially hidden object to be the stimulus that
would capture the viewer’s attention, especially when distracted.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The audience for the exhibition comprised predominantly gallery
and museum goers, including scientists, students, and the general
public. My study was designed to assess the effects of gallery con-
textualization upon attentional shifts. My assumption was that art
audiences will sometimes have developed special skills; frequent
gallery-goers often learn to look intensely and compare viewing
works of art with prior experiences. The installation was designed
to foster such informal learning through repeating the depictions
of similar objects (images of both the targets and distractors) in
different media as the viewer moved through the exhibition space.
My exhibition offered an opportunity to try to assess the inﬂuence
of an esthetic environment to promote informal learning; com-
mercial galleries are often conditioned by trends and will rarely
accommodate this kind of interest. Written materials accompa-
nied the exhibition, including the title of the exhibition (Stealing
Attention), signage (the names of the art works displayed and other
information), and a press release; all provided minimal clues as to
the content of the exhibition. Another advantage of a public exhi-
bition for a psychophysical test is that serious art visitors will often
be engaged in visual search and discrimination tasks. Although
viewers are generally free to wander at will, the layout and ﬂow
through gallery spaces are often carefully crafted. For example,
many artists and curators juxtapose speciﬁc objects and images to
build a totality of relationships that offer more as a whole than
when seen individually. To prompt viewers who did not initially
see the targets in the animation after several viewings, I had placed
static images of the targets throughout the installation in order
to re-direct their attention to the targets when they returned to
the animation. I therefore considered their possible movements
through the space and installed static works that could provide
repeated cues.
I asked a series of questions to determine what viewers saw
before and aftermoving through the exhibition space1. To a limited
extent I was able to assess the involvement of people by:
• Observing how they moved through the gallery and whether
they read signage.
• Soliciting their comments to assess if they recognizedmy artistic
intentions.
• Identifying whether they requested information or proposed a
hypothesis.
• Interpreting their responses, particularly emotional reactions.
• Determining if “ﬂexible thinking” occurred as evidenced by a
revision of what they saw.
My studywas repeated in several different contexts andwith a vari-
ety of formats. The animation that I designed with Goldberg was
modeled after the Simon and Chabris animation, but with signif-
icant differences. The Flash animation program was randomized
both positionally and temporally and prevented the viewer from
predicting what card would ﬂash and where it would be located
on the screen or from determining what antiquity, assuming it was
perceived, would next be removed. In each cycle all nine images of
the hands of Three-Card Monte players were displayed once and
were taken from a pool of nine “cells”of images of hands “playing”
cards. Going through one cycle of nine random positions took
approximately 2.7 s (0.3 s × 9). One of the nine cells showed the
Queen of Hearts. It stayed on the screen for about 300 ms. The
construction of the animation included the additional image of a
yellow circle that preceded each appearance of the image of the
Queen of Hearts with which it was temporally linked. It was on
view for only a moment, thus serving as a “ﬂicker” that further
distracted the viewer from noticing the disappearing relics. Every
third time the yellow circle appeared a target disappeared fromone
of the three depicted shelves in the background of the animation.
It took 30 cycles to go from an image of 10 relics on three shelves to
three empty shelves. At this point approximately 81 s had passed,
and the program then displayed a gradually fading mound of rub-
ble suggestive of the aftermath of the looting of the museum. The
program then paused for 20 s before starting the next iteration. I
learned by much trial-and-error what conditions would best foster
recognition of the phenomenon in the context of an art exhibi-
tion. To collect as much data as possible, I created both a gallery
situated and studio-situated experimental situation that allowed
me to assess the presence of re-directed viewing among a sample
of participants. Data came from the following sources:
1The questions were loosely adapted from a 2003 study jointly conducted by the
Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum and Institute for Learning Innovation Institute;
see http://www.gardnermuseum.org/education/research.
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• Gallery situated: Michael Steinberg Fine Arts during the course
of the exhibition (March 19–April 18, 2009) and Ronald
Feldman Fine Arts (May 15–July 23).
• Studio-situated: Attendance from two art classes (April 30, 2010
and November16, 2010) and two Art/Sci Salons (April 8, 2010
and December11, 2010).
In its ﬁrst gallery viewing at Michael Steinberg Fine Arts, the
animation occupied a fully lit room that contained several mixed-
media two-dimensional representations (Figure 2). The exhibi-
tion title and signage were intended to offer suggestive clues as
to the content of the exhibition without being “giveaways.” The
same antiquities were depicted in these art works as those shown
within the Flash animation. These mixed-media works on wood
contained ﬁgure–ground reversals and Necker illusion perspective
reversals, in which the depiction alternatively recedes and juts for-
ward. The depicted setting for these “thefts” was the interior of
a museum sometimes identiﬁed through applied lettering as the
National Museum of Iraq.
Upon leaving this entrance space, the visitor entered a corridor
that had six art works, each 30 × 24′′. These consisted of a com-
bination of real and illusory images in which some of the forms
were painted to look like collage. The images depicted were of
hands appropriated from either Caravaggio or de la Tour paint-
ings. They grasped looted Eastern antiquities that were partially
hidden behind playing cards (Figure 3). The partial transparency
of the hands and cards was very similar to the transparency of the
targets in the animation.
The corridor opened into a back room, which had several
more of my art works and into a smaller installation room that
was painted black (Figure 4) and featured a single empty white
shelf. Suspended just above the shelf were prints from a database
of looted Iraqi objects, which featured images identical to those
shown in the Flash animation. If someone viewed the entire exhi-
bition and then returned to the animation, these additional clues
were designed to make it more evident that the animation showed
FIGURE 2 | Installation view of “stealing attention.”
the disappearance of stolen Iraqi antiquities. The titles of the sta-
tic works also provided such clues as Conning Baghdad, Grafﬁti in
Iraq, and Fleeced Chariot.
During theMichael Steinberg FineArts exhibition,visitorswere
askedwhat theyobserved.During theopening andapre-scheduled
class visit, a video camera was positioned facing out from the
FIGURE 3 | Disappearing Act, painted (illusory) and real collage.
FIGURE 4 | Black installation room, bare shelf with print-outs of looted
Iraqi antiquities.
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wall toward the viewers. I eliminated all but three of those inter-
viewed at the opening, which, with these exceptions, did not offer
a consistent testing situation. Having observed the difﬁculty of
target detection during the opening (where there were additional
distractions), after the opening I slowed the rate of the ﬂashing
hands to make target detection easier.
I was able to approximate similar circumstances of viewing in
my studio space to that of Michael Steinberg Fine Arts, including
static art works and database prints. This enabled me to document
the responses of several different groups of visitors to my studio,
including artists, art historians, and musicians.
For a third display at Ronald Feldman Fine Arts, NYC, I created
a multi-unit work (Figure 5).
Since I did not have the entire gallery space to work with, I
needed to provide more clues to the viewer within the animation.
This time, instead of the header, “Would you like to play Three-
Card Monte?” the text in the animation asked whether the viewer
would like to play Three-Card Monte with George W. Bush. When
the image of rubble appeared at the end of each iteration, for a
brief moment an almost subliminal message appeared that identi-
ﬁed the scene as“TheNationalMuseumof Iraq.”Given the limited
space I also needed to rely on depicted still images in one part of
the three-part work as a way to contextualize the animation. The
FIGURE 5 | Installation at Ronald Feldman Fine Art, NYC.
animation was placed next to a painted collage, and both were jux-
taposed with an empty shelf (over the monitor) from which prints
of looted objects dangled. In this way a viewer could compare
the images of missing antiquities in each of the three units and
ﬂesh out the connections between them. The viewer was therefore
offered several ways of assimilating and correlating information.
RESULTS
A total of 82 individuals, predominantly from the arts, were
observed in the experiment at all three locations. More than half
the participants were female; all were adults and predominantly
Caucasian. Overall, 32 of these 82 (39%) remarked on the targets
after their initial viewing of the animation. Of the 50 who did
not initially remark on the targets, 32 (64%) did after having seen
additional visual prompts (Table 1).
During the scheduled visit of an art history class on March 28,
2009, several groups of viewers arrived at the gallery at different
times. They totaled 19 viewers who consisted predominantly of
art history students along with unidentiﬁed viewers who joined
the groups. Since clusters of people were involved, I asked those
present to indicate to me what they saw privately and not to dis-
cuss their ﬁndings aloud. Of this group, 13 of the 19 viewers
did not initially see the targets (the disappearing antiquities). I
asked the viewers what they saw in the animation both before they
walked through the entire installation and then afterward, while
they re-viewed the animation. While people continued to watch
the animation, I asked them to report on the cards and anything
else they saw. Of 13 viewers, six now saw the targets. For those who
still did not see the targets, I explicitly asked them to ignore the
distractors; all but one viewer saw the targets.While people walked
around the exhibition, I would often ask them what they thought
the work was about. I had opportunities to test the perceptions
of other gallery-goers in similar ways. Of 31 additional viewers
to the show, 18 did not initially see the targets. Of these, 10 saw
the targets after moving through the exhibition and re-viewing
the animation while being asked the same questions as previously.
For those who still did not see the targets, when asked explicitly to
ignore the distractors, all but one viewer saw the targets.
After the exhibition had concluded, a small art group of six
people (experienced art goers) came to my studio; only two of
the six initially saw the targets. Upon further viewing and walking
around the studio to see the related still images, only two did not
Table 1 | Summary results of targets seen at three locations.
Location Occasion Number of viewers Target seen Target unseen Target seen on re-viewing
Steinberg Art class and others 19 6 13 6
Steinberg Various 31 13 18 10
Studio Art group 6 2 4 4
Studio Musicians 7 2 5 4
Studio Art/sci 10 5 5 4
Feldman Various 8 3 5 4
Studio Viewer EF 1 1 0 0
Total 82 32 50 32
Percentage seeing target 39.0% 64.0%
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see the targets. After being asked to disregard the hands while re-
viewing the animation, all saw the targets. Another small group of
sevenmusicians from Juilliard also participated.Of this group, two
quickly saw the critical targets (one almost immediately), and four
succeeded before being asked to disregard the distractors. Eleven
more people from two art and science gatherings saw the exper-
imental set up at my studio at varied times; six of them initially
saw the targets, and after further viewing, all did. There was one
especially intriguing interchange. After only a single iteration one
artist was able not only to provide the correct number of times
that the Queen of Hearts appeared, but she was also able to see the
disappearing antiquities. I asked her how she accomplished this so
quickly, and she said that her art training had provided her with
this ability.
I had further opportunity to test the phenomenon of inat-
tention blindness during a group exhibition at Ronald Feldman
Fine Arts that included my art work. Of the eight viewers with
whom I spoke, three saw the targets after two iterations. Four of
the remaining ﬁve later saw them after several more iterations of
the animation, and the ﬁfth viewer saw them after I asked him to
disregard the distractors.
POTENTIAL CONFOUNDS
I could correlate my observations with the likelihood that learn-
ing had occurred but could not make causal inferences about the
effect of the repeated images on such learning, since several factors
could have inﬂuenced the ability of some viewers to see the targets
after ﬁrst missing them. One potential confound was interpreting
the ability of viewers to remark on the target when re-viewing the
animation after having seen the rest of the installation. There is the
possibility of improved performance simply as a result of repeated
viewing of the animation. Although this is a possible explanation
of the results, it is unlikely because viewers who initially saw the
animation (who had not yet gone through the entire installation)
who did not remark on the targets generally also saw the anima-
tion several times. The animation was continuously playing so
most viewers would have seen several iterations by the time they
answered my initial question (“What do you see?”). Of course I
could not know how much repetition would be needed for a target
to attract attention. My understanding was that costs are involved
in switching attention and something else must occur to enable
the perception of a target besides repeated viewing. It also seems
plausible that after failing to observe the target, repeated viewings
could reinforce the blindness, which was the point that Treisman
and De Shepper had made about the increased ability of viewers
to ignore distractors after ignoring them once.
Another confound was that the animation was continuously
playing so most viewers would have seen several iterations by the
time they answered my initial question (“What do you see?”).
Although I tried to direct people when to start viewing the anima-
tion, it was not always possible to control. Some viewers did not see
the animation from the beginning, and, as a result, did not see the
assigned task (“Count the number of times the Queen of Hearts
appears!”) at ﬁrst viewing. In addition, questions often needed to
be asked of groups of viewers rather than individuals raising the
likelihood of inﬂuence from reports by others even though peo-
ple were asked to speak with me later privately. Apart from those
viewers who were questioned, no effort was made to control the
ﬂow of people through the exhibition space. As a result, an average
viewer might have seen the animation at any point in its iteration
while viewing the exhibition in its entirety.
The complexity of the large-scale works on wood might also
have been a confound since theseworks did not offer instant recog-
nition of the targets. However, for most viewers, the smaller works
and dark room installation with the database prints, in particular,
were giveaways in terms of identifying the targets.
Each of the three circumstances of viewing (the two galleries
and studio installation) was somewhat different. Finally, I had
no way of determining whether the visitors would apply/transfer
knowledge gained about inattention blindness to other contexts.
The actual risk of the experiment was that, if the clues provided
to the viewer were insufﬁcient, the viewer might remain entirely
unaware of the relics disappearing andonly perceive ﬂashinghands
and cards in the animation and view the animation and installation
as being unrelated. At the other extreme, if viewers received too
many clues, the risk was that viewers might not realize that their
recognition of the existence of a fundamental perceptual prob-
lem comprised the basic content of the exhibition. In other words,
it was important that viewers could intuit the artistic intentions.
The ideal situation was to enable the viewer to become suddenly
and consciously aware that the relics were disappearing. To set up
conditions to foster this “epiphany” proved a difﬁcult challenge.
It necessitated many preliminary trials varying the speed of the
hands ﬂashing and their degree of transparency until a successful
balance had been judged to be achieved.
It should be noted that this investigation had no control group.
As already observed, it was also difﬁcult to control the parame-
ters in a way that facilitated rigorous testing (e.g., starting and
stopping the animation after each viewing to regulate the number
of repetitions to which each viewer was exposed). In addition,
such regulation would have been self-defeating; as the project
involved esthetics in relation to learning, it was also important
to maintain the ambiance of a gallery as opposed to a psychologi-
cal experiment. I therefore collected information as unobtrusively
as possible.
DISCUSSION OF THE ART EXPERIMENT
I found support that art can re-direct attention based on the evi-
dence that afterwalking around the full installation,more thanhalf
of the viewerswhohadnot originally been aware of the targets sub-
sequently remarked on them when they re-viewed the animation.
Perhaps the strongest indication that learning (deﬁned as a gain
in awareness) may have occurred was that, based on participants’
comments, it became evident that some of those who had origi-
nally not understood what the animation had to do with the rest
of the installation had subsequently gained the understanding that
their own“attention” skills determined whether or not the anima-
tion and installation were linked. In other words, the installation
encouraged self-reﬂection about the constraints on our attentional
system that everyone experiences but of which few are consciously
aware.
This experiment does not offer proof of a direct link between art
training and the ability to perform attentional switches although
it does, perhaps, suggest some of the potential for art to modulate
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the attention of engaged participants. In addition this experiment
did not disambiguate learning (possibly through a priming effect)
and repetitive viewing. Further reﬁnements for the future might
include a control groupunaccustomed to art exhibitions,assuming
that this could be done without disrupting the esthetic environ-
ment. Another control could consist of a group led through the
installation before viewing the dynamic stimulus on the grounds
that it might help distinguish whether repetitive viewing or prim-
ing enabled the seeing of the targets in the re-viewed animation. In
point of fact, many viewers did go directly to the back or the mid-
dle of the exhibition, particularly when others blocked their view
of the animation, but systematic questions related to perceiving
the targets were not asked of them.
The mixed-media paintings featured depicted images of stolen
antiquities identical to those shown in the background of the
animation and primed the viewers to recognize those objects
(Figure 6).
For some viewers, the collage paintings in my exhibition rein-
forced the viewer’s gradual realization that perceptual issues were
the subject of the installation. My process was to start by making
a drawing that served as the basis for a digital print (Figure 7).
It was deliberately made smaller than the wood on which it was
mounted. A process ensued of cutting, rotating, and reposition-
ing the print on the wood. When pulled apart, the print disrupted
someof the continuity of perspective and forms (thus also disrupt-
ing the illusionism). All of the repositioning and superimposed
painting created a maze of ﬁgure/ground reversals, rotations, and
line displacements. Thepaintings thus displayed the circumstances
under which illusion occurs and is destroyed. Perspectival illu-
sions were also disrupted by mental attempts to piece the original
units together, so these works served as another way to show the
viewer how attention could be misdirected. As I noted previously,
the complexity of these works might also have been a confound
since it made instant recognition of the targets difﬁcult. However,
when coupled with the dark room installation and smaller mon-
tages that focused on the hands, cards, and targets, sufﬁcient clues
were provided to allow recognition of the targets. In addition,
the incorporation of text within the large-scale works sometimes
indicated that the National Museum of Iraq and looting were the
subjects of the art. The role of the static art works and black
room installation within the exhibition became that of “context-
providers”as opposed to existing solely as discrete art objects. They
provided “contextual cueing” (Chun and Jiang, 1998) and served
as emotional signiﬁers, likely prompting recognition of the targets
within the animation.
CONDITIONS OF VIEWING
Mack and Rock have pointed out that three kinds of conditions
are generally involved in tests of inattention blindness: inattention,
divided attention, and full attention. In my project, the trials were
conducted as viewers watched the animation. The ﬁrst trial was
held after the viewer saw the ﬁrst iteration of the animation and
before viewing the entire installation. The second trial was held
after subjects viewed the installation and while they re-viewed the
animation. Both the ﬁrst and second trials were inattention trials.
The viewers were only asked to report on what they saw. During
the second trial, as subjects continued to watch the animation,
they were asked to observe the ﬂashing cards and “anything else.”
This was an explicit divided attention task since the viewers were
asked to report on both the distraction and the presence of some-
thing else. The divided attention trial thus provided information
about the subjects’ ability to see both the targets and distractors.
If someone still did not see the targets, I conducted a full attention
trial in which the subject was explicitly asked to disregard the dis-
traction task (i.e., the ﬂashing cards) and report only the presence
of something else on the screen (e.g., the critical targets). With the
full attention trial almost all the viewers succeeded in identifying
the critical targets.
Returning to theﬁrst of the four questions (What does attention
make possible?), I could now answer in agreement with the ﬁnd-
ings of Mack and Rock that attention is necessary for perception.
The assigned task in the animation (count the number of times the
FIGURE 6 | Static work Fleeced Chariot, paint (illusory) and real
collage on wood, 2009.
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Queen of Hearts appears) directed attention to the distractors and
at least half the viewers were effectively blind to the targets. This
“blinded” group of viewers only succeeded in seeing the targets
when their attention had been switched to the circumstances of
either divided attention or full attention. Mack and Rock made it
clear that the important scientiﬁc measure is to compare reports
of the critical stimulus in the inattention trial with those in the full
attention trial because this difference indicates what is contributed
by attention.
With regard to the second question (Can attention be shifted?),
most viewers were engaged in a visual search task for the Queen
of Hearts. The exceptions were those who disregarded the task,
those who successfully divided their attention, and those who
started viewing the animation after the counting task had been
assigned and were initially unaware of the task. The assigned task
FIGURE 7 | Conning Baghdad, paint (illusory) and real collage on
wood, 2009.
guaranteed that many viewers would be looking in the general
area without expecting or looking for the targets. My ﬁndings
agreed with Mack and Rock’s observation that attention can be
shifted when the viewer realizes that something other than what
is most visually obvious is at stake. In this case, the distractors
were the most obvious thing. However, for more than half of the
viewers who had not remarked on the targets at the ﬁrst trial, the
installation created a salient alternative: namely the disappearing
antiquities. The way this switch might have occurred is discussed
later in this paper. But it seems to me that the important point
was that, by viewing the installation in its entirety, many viewers
recognized my artistic intention and, as a result, could remark on
the targets.
The third question (Does art training help prevent distraction?)
asked whether seasoned art viewers might integrate input from the
animation into a framework of prior knowledge gained from their
gallery or life experience and override the tendency to follow the
instructions provided at the onset of the animation. Despite the
fact that many viewers reading the instruction immediately started
to search for the Queen of Hearts, many were able to see the tar-
gets after only a few iterations. In addition, there was evidence that
some could do both operations (see the distractors and targets
simultaneously). How did they accomplish this? I attributed it to
the fact that most viewers in my survey were routine gallery-goers
and had learned to encompass a whole visual ﬁeld.
During the 1960s,psychoanalystAntonEhrenzhweig haddevel-
oped a theory that “de-differentiated” viewing was a mark of cre-
ativity as opposed to “gestalt-based” viewing proposed by Gestalt
theorists such as Rudolf Arnheim andErnstGombrich that singled
out one particular area of a visual ﬁeld at the expense of others
(Jones, 1996, p. 325). Piaget (1930) used the term “syncretistic”
while explaining how children viewed causality. A distinctive fea-
ture of children’s art was to emphasize a juxtaposition of parts.
Ehrenzweig (1962, 1971) similarly described syncretic vision as
seeing-together, meaning vision that can ignore the distinctions
between ﬁgure and ground. He championed this approach to cre-
ativity, explaining that syncretism involves the idea of looking at
a ﬁeld without differentiation (such as seeing the ﬁgure at the
expense of the ground). He stated that no single act of attention
can take in the whole of the visual ﬁeld, but the mark of good art
was to be able to create a work in which every detail was viewed as
part of the overall structure. Findings have suggested that highly
creative individuals deploy their attention in a diffuse rather than a
focused manner (Ansburg and Hill, 2003). Ehrenzweig concluded
that grasping the picture as an indivisiblewhole is accomplished by
a scattering of focus and serves the vital purpose of aiding survival
in the real world. According to Ehrenzweig, this de-differentiated
viewing would also allow us to see the two proﬁles of Rubin’s
vases simultaneously although he could not test this at the time
(Ehrenzweig, 1971, pp. 22–23). The idea was that a viewer can be
receptive and take in a mass of concrete detail without needing to
consciously identify it. Another word for this visual talent is ﬂex-
ibility. A later study similarly concluded that “formal art training
results in a global recognition of the pictorial structures involved
along with narrative concerns. Attention is shifted away from local
feature analysis and information gathering” (Nodine et al., 1993,
p. 227). These explanations are suggestive of why one artist in my
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study was able to see the targets and distractors simultaneously
and quickly. It also explains how the training that artists receive is
essential to developing such ﬂexibility.
Other gallery-goers reported that they had difﬁculty tracking
the cards and stopped counting them altogether. However, this
did not seem to impact on their ability to see or not see the
background targets. A similar result was reported by Simon and
Chabris. Michael Goldberg, who showed the animation to a group
of physiology students and colleagues at Columbia (before it had
been adjusted for speed and without beneﬁt of any of the contex-
tualization of the animation provided by the installation), noted
that most of his viewers saw only the ﬂashing hands and cards.
This difference of response between the scientists (at the labo-
ratory) and artists (at the gallery) is suggestive of the difference
in training between these groups, but it is inconclusive since the
animation shown was not identical. More importantly, the view-
ers at Columbia would have had no way to identify my artistic
intentions without the contextualization from either static images
or, conceivably, from sound (if riﬂe shots and breaking glass had
accompanied the animation).
Finally, with respect to the fourth and last question (Can
art train attention?), the results indicated that artworks have
the potential to redirect attention and thus switch a viewer’s
“attention-set.”At the least,most viewers expressed awareness that
a perceptual problem had been staged, and a few noted that their
attention was being manipulated. My results therefore answered
the question afﬁrmatively that art offers a training ground for
attention. Nevertheless, on the basis of my experiment I must
qualify an afﬁrmative response to the question whether attention
can be trained by art. The reasons for this qualiﬁcation include the
lack of a control group, occasional difﬁculties of recording data at
the time the tests were taken, inability to control test parameters
and maintain an esthetic setting, the need to speak with groups on
occasion, and the lack of fully consistent circumstances of viewing.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING
Psychology has investigated learning and memory by dividing it
into categories such as non-associative and associative (Thomp-
son, 1986). An example of non-associative learning is habituation
and it often involves a single event. By contrast, associative learn-
ing involves the conjunction of several events and is divided into
Pavlovian conditioning (e.g., the ringing of a bell is associated
with food) and instrumental conditioning (e.g., pressing a lever to
obtain food). Classic psychological studies have determined that
the amygdala complex impacts on the amount of attention an
object receives; it assigns an emotional salience (signiﬁcance) to
objects or events through associative learning (Klüver and Bucy,
1997). Researchers (Gallagher and Holland, 1994) have provided
evidence that a subsystem within the amygdala provides a coordi-
nated regulation of attentional processes. This is pertinent to my
study of inattention blindness because the cues that were supplied
by the full installation were not neutral ones, but ones that refer-
enced the war in Iraq and the destruction of a cultural heritage. I
suggest that those viewers who made the associations between the
targets and what they represented would have “learned” to asso-
ciate the targets with the war and be more likely to recognize the
targets when they returned to the animation. In other words, this
learned association would have given a charged signiﬁcance to the
target and impacted the attentional system.
Posner and Petersen (1990) have shown that different oper-
ations within the attention networks are responsible for such
activities as disengaging attention, shifting attention, and engaging
a selective focus of attention. Routes of neuroanatomical connec-
tivity between the amygdala and other brain systems allow some
regulation over the attentional system (Gallagher and Holland,
1994). The role that emotion plays in regulating attention (and
“capturing” attention through arousal) can and has been tradi-
tionally capitalized upon by educators – and by artists. Greater
learning occurs with salient examples and associations.
In 2007, Posner et al. described how individual differences
might account for differences in the efﬁciency of the attentional
system, reﬂecting both genes and experience. Posner and Rothbart
(2007) have suggested that we view learning as exercise for the
brain, which might strengthen the neural circuits involved with
memory work and attention. The basic idea about attention train-
ing is that the repeated activation of attentional networks through
such training will increase their efﬁciency. They pointed out that
early researchers (e.g., Thorndike, 1903; Simon, 1969) dismissed
the idea of attention training because they had concluded that
training is domain-speciﬁc and cannot be more broadly applied to
the general training of the mind. The example provided was math-
ematics, which was not believed to involve transferable properties.
However, Posner and Rothbart demonstrated that attention is an
exception to being domain-speciﬁc and that attention training can,
in fact, be transferred to other areas of the brain. They claimed,
“Attention involves speciﬁc brain mechanisms, as we have seen,
but its function is to inﬂuence the operation of other brain net-
works”(Posner andRothbart, 2007,p. 13). Posner et al. (2008), also
proposed that both memory and attention in children diagnosed
with ADHD can be improved through art training. They identi-
ﬁed some of the factors involved with improvement as including
enhanced motivation and the fact that there are speciﬁc brain net-
works involving different art forms. The more general implication
may be that viewers might derive indirect beneﬁt from certain art-
works to whatever extent the actions prompted by the artworks
overlap with the formalized tasks of scientiﬁc attentional training
and testing.
Psychologists Ellen Winner and Lois Hetland have challenged
instrumental claims that study of the arts can lead to improvement
in standardized achievement tests (Winner and Hetland, 2000).
Their skepticism does not, however, negate other possible beneﬁts
of art with regard to learning. Winner et al. (2006) have pointed
out the necessity of understanding the actual skills that are gained
through art-making. They include experimentation, expression,
problem solving, observation, and evaluation, along with under-
standing the art culture. It seems to me that, as I found in my own
art experiment, galleries, and museums can also play a greater role
in developing such skills.
THE ROLE OF ESTHETICS
Some objects, artworks, and performances draw attention not to
informational data, but instead set in motion simulated events
that may involve a qualitative transformation in the viewers. These
objects can be thought of as boundary objects, which probe the
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way the mind works. My goal was that the installation, Stealing
Attention, would function in this manner and help the viewer see
something thatwas otherwise invisible.As philosophers and artists
(notably Picasso) have frequently pointed out, in order to get to
a truth that is invisible, art must falsify vision in some sense. An
important part of an artist’s training involves the ability to con-
trive a believable scene or event with the realization that it entails
a falsiﬁcation of vision. In addition, an art student must learn how
to manipulate a viewer’s attention. These skills are not only part
of an artists’ training, but must also be developed in rehabilitative
work involving the senses.
A true scientiﬁc study with strict experimental parameters and
controls would have destroyed an atmosphere of esthetic con-
templation, and this state was an important component of my
project. As Kant pointed out over a century ago, the esthetic object
offers viewers a way to experience pleasure through the “quicken-
ing” of their “cognitive faculties.” This process involves “the active
engagement of the cognitive powers without ulterior aim” (Kant,
1790/1951, p. 68). To create a minimal esthetic condition a viewer
must realize that a formal event and staging of images are inten-
tional. It must also be recognized that the dynamics of attention
actually structure what is perceived as relevant. For my study of
inattention blindness, I sought a balance between the sometimes-
conﬂicted goals of creating a moving work of art versus designing
an effective experiment. Despite these conﬂicts, what artists can
provide to the study of attention are ways to design situations
where self-discovery on the part of the viewer might suddenly
occur as the viewer registers a moment of surprised recognition of
something signiﬁcant that was previously missed.
INATTENTION BLINDNESS AS VIEWED IN ART HISTORY
In addition to works by Caravaggio, de la Tour, and Bosch, another
example of inattention blindness, although also not explicitly
labeled as such by art historians,mightwell beChardin’sTheHouse
of Cards. According to art historian Fried (2007), Chardin called
attention to “the telling juxtaposition of two playing cards in the
partly open drawer in the near foreground.”Fried noted that in the
depictedopendrawer inTheHouse of Cards,whichmarks the plane
closest to us, one of the cards (the Jack of Hearts) is fully facing the
viewer and open to his or her gaze. Fried pointed out that this is in
contrast to the second card, which is hidden. He then concluded
that Chardin’s intentionality is made apparent by his creation of
the ﬁction of a card that is hidden to the depicted ﬁgures in the
art work and responsible for the work’s importance. The inten-
tionality that Fried prized in Chardin is signiﬁed by the fact that
in Chardin’s work, a posed, painted actor looks like he is oblivious
to the hidden card and to our viewing of him (Figure 8). As Fried
has emphasized, we, the viewers, must accept what we know can-
not actually be the case, since the likelihood is that this painting,
like others, was made from a posed model. Fried’s interest in the
artist’s intentionality is shared by some scientists andphilosophers.
A large part of the importance of a painting is how it reveals the
intentions of the artist and thus is indicative of larger patterns
of conscious attentional decisions (Roskill, 1989). Philosopher
Rollins (2004) has suggested that the artist’s intentionality in cre-
ating an artwork marks the difference between an art object and a
non-art object that has similar esthetic traits. I suggest that what
Chardin staged was an occurrence of what scientists might now
FIGURE 8 | Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin,The House of Cards, ca.
1737, oil on canvas, 82.2 cm×66 cm, National Gallery of Art,
Washington, AndrewW. Mellon Collection, Source:TheYorck Project,
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
license and the GNU Free Documentation License.
identify as inattention blindness. This painting then conﬁrms that
training in the manipulation of attention is something that artists
have long received.
It would seem that, just as cognitive examinations can test
for ﬂexibility, art works might also foster learning. One of the
tests used to help determine whether an individual has ADHD
is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, a neuropsychological test of
“set-shifting” (Berg, 1948). Stimulus cards that contain shapes of
different colors, amounts, and designs are presented to the subject.
The person administering the test asks the subject to match the
cards by color, design, or quantity. To accomplish this, the par-
ticipant is then given a stack of additional cards and asked to
match each one to one of the stimulus cards, thereby forming
separate piles of cards for each. The matching rules are changed
unpredictably during the course of the test, and the time taken
for the participant to learn the new rules and the mistakes made
during this learning process are analyzed to arrive at a score.
The test is considered to measure the ﬂexibility in being able to
shift mental sets, and it also assesses perseveration and abstract
(categorical) thinking. It has thus been considered a measure of
executive function.
The patient who has a frontal lobe deﬁcit lacks a “supervi-
sory attentive” system. According to Changeux (1994), when that
patient takes the Wisconsin Sorting Card Test, he or she does not
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become aware of the changes in the examiner’s strategy and will
perseverate, repeating the same mistakes. Signiﬁcantly, Changeux
has compared the difﬁculty held by such patients to their inabil-
ity to intuit the intentionality of an artwork. He stated, “It would
appear then that the frontal cortex intervenes both in the genesis
of hypotheses and in the elaboration of critical judgment, both
faculties being essential for viewing a painting, as we have seen”
(Changeux, 1994, p. 192). In this way Changeux makes explicit the
generally unrecognized ability of an artwork to test the viewer’s
mental ﬂexibility.
ATTENTION SWITCHING
How might the repeated images have enabled many viewers to
shift their attentional set? Perhaps art historian Jonathan Crary
supplies part of the answer. In Suspensions of Perception (1999), he
addressed the important issue of attentional alternation between
engagement and fatigue. Crary’s thesis was that that the poles of
attention and distraction can best be understood as a continuum,
pointing out that attention carries within it “the conditions for its
own disintegration” (Crary, 1999, p. 47). But Crary also cautioned
readers against viewing Cézanne’s works as the results of faith-
fully portraying his “subjective optical impressions” (Crary, 1999,
p. 301). He viewed Cézanne as recording attention, itself, dur-
ing which time Cézanne’s alternation between focused intensity
and overall defocused viewing embodied his attentional gaze –
the countless shifts, saccades, and blinks as the scene changed
before the artist. To me his insight into Cézanne’s work shows the
advantage that accrues to some static works like paintings. They
can memorialize the eye’s activities, something that could not be
accomplished in the same way if the artworks were themselves in
motion. In addition, still works can be contrasted and contextual-
ized with a medium such as animation that relies on movement.
There is no need to make a choice between these modes. This is
why Stealing Attention was a multimedia exhibition, utilizing a
dark installation room, an animation, and collages: it offered the
viewer several ways to confront and contrast information delivered
both slowly and quickly. Static images might also offer the viewer
the chance to refresh the fatigue that accompanies intense viewing.
The linking of alternating engagement and fatigue with inat-
tention blindness ﬁnds some support in science. Dehaene and
Changeux (2005) developed a model for inattention blindness
that takes into account a neuromodulatory substance that causes
the attentional network to exhibit a surge of activation, involving
synchronized gamma-band oscillations of increasing amplitude.
They proposed that this corresponds to a state of vigilance and
also hypothesized a second state transition, involving a tempo-
rary increase in synchronized ﬁring. They consider that this state
of activity may compete with sensory processing and lead to
an extinction of sensory processing that may account for the
phenomenon of inattention blindness.
Attentional selection has been distinguished as either goal-
directed (top-down) or stimulus-directed (bottom-up; Lamy
and Bar-Anan, 2008). Top-down selection, a volitional act, is
an executive function of experience and expectations. It is an
endogenous control of attention that refers to the ability of the
observer’s goals or intentions to determine which areas, attrib-
utes, or objects are selected for further visual processing. By
contrast, bottom-up or exogenous control refers to the capacity of
certain stimulus properties to attract attention. Bottom-up atten-
tiveness originates with the stimulus and is almost impossible to
ignore. Neuroscientist Charles Connor and his team have spec-
ulated, “What happens in the brain when these two processes
interact?. . . the complex dynamic interplay between bottom-up
and top-down attention determines what we are aware of from
moment to moment” (Connor et al., 2004). Research has focused
on the relative contributions of these two sources of guidance. At
one end of the continuum, neuroscientist Jan Theuwes proposed
that“attentional priority” is entirely under the control of stimulus-
driven factors, which entails that attention is directed to the “most
salient object” in the visual ﬁeld regardless of the observers’ goals
(Theeuwes, 2004). At the other end, neuroscientists Folk et al.
(1992) have claimed that objects receiving attentional priority are
contingent on attentional goal settings and that a salient object
outside the observer’s attentional set might not capture atten-
tion (e.g., a top-down approach). This issue remains controversial.
More recent research has focused on the relative contributions of
these two sources of guidance and investigated the extent to which
the attentional set adopted by the observer can control which
objects in the visual ﬁeld receive attentional priority. In the absence
of any particular intention, stimuli we happen to encounter evoke
tendencies to perform tasks that are habitually associated with
them.
Neuroscientists have contended that the cognitive task we per-
form at each moment results from a complex interplay of deliber-
ate intentions that are governed by goals and the availability and
frequency of the alternative tasks afforded by the stimulus. In task
switching experiments, responses to the same set of stimuli dif-
fer depending on the goals of the individual at any point in time
(Monsell, 2003). What is known is that a switch from one task
to another brings about increased response times and increased
errors.
As conﬁrmed by psychologists Arrington and Logan (2005)
in discussing switch costs, “. . .voluntary task switching requires
subjects to choose the task to be performed on a given trial and
thus ensures that a top-down act of control is involved in task
switching. The voluntary task switching procedure inverts the
usual question in task switching experiments. Instead of asking
whether switch costs reﬂect a top-down act of control, it asks
whether a top-down act of control produces switch costs.” These
researchers concluded that switch costs are incurred. They deter-
mined that top-down accounts typically focused“on the processes
that enabled a new conﬁguration of subordinate processes (or task
set). The enabling processesmay involve updating goals inworking
memory. . . or adjusting attentional biases and priorities suggest-
ing that the extra endogenous act of control that occurs on switch
trials can be initiated, and at least partially carried out, prior to the
onset of the target stimulus” (Arrington and Logan, 2005, p. 684).
Task switching has been found to take place under the circum-
stances of divided attention and also when viewers are instructed
to ignore the task in favor of another. However, even voluntary
(top-down) choices appear to be inﬂuenced by bottom-up factors.
Experimental psychologist Nick Yeung has stated that “. . .present
ﬁndings suggest that bottom-up factorsmay be a primary determi-
nant of the costs associated with voluntary task switching. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, the switch cost does not directly index
the time consumed by the process of activating or enabling new
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task-level representations. Rather, the cost reﬂects a relative failure
to activate such representations following a change of task, result-
ing in increased between-task competition and hence impaired
performance” (Yeung, 2010, p. 360). It appears that relatively little
is currently known about the extent to which bottom-up factors
may contribute to voluntary switching performance. Apparently
an asymmetry is involved in making a task switch; it has been
attributed to “between-task interference” and explored in compu-
tational models (Yeung and Monsell, 2003). It may be easier to
make a switch by performing an easier task (Mayr and Bell, 2006).
It was found by some researchers that, even when more difﬁcult
in terms of the costs involved, participants favored task repetitions
over task switches (Yeung, 2010).
The way in which this information pertains to the art exper-
iment that I conducted is that, in Stealing Attention a task was
assigned to the viewer. This made it likely that the uninitiated
viewer would initially utilize top-down guidance in following the
instructions. As documented, those viewers interviewed who did
not initially remark on the relics disappearing (about half) were
generally able to identify the disappearing antiquities after they
viewed the entire installation and repeatedly viewed the anima-
tion. Apparently attention had been re-directed although I was
not in a position to determine how. My hypothesis was that the
emotional salience of the images may have played a role in addi-
tion to the repetition of the images. It also seems to me that you
could account for the new ability of viewers to see the targets by
top-down, bottom-up, or combinations of both mechanisms. If
top-down, the viewers would now actively seek out those images
of targets in the animation thatwere identical to those in the instal-
lation. If bottom-up, the salience of the targets would now have
attracted the viewer’s attention through priming. It is also recog-
nized that task switching can occur under the circumstances of
divided attention and during full attention (viewers are instructed
to disregard the distractors).
SALIENCE
How can emotional stimuli direct the focus of attention? This
question is very relevant to understanding how the emotional
salience of looted antiquities might have helped bring about
an attention switch when subjects re-viewed the animation.
According to neuroscientist, Rebecca J. Compton, two stages are
involved in theprocessingof emotional information.Comptonhas
stated, “First, emotional signiﬁcance is evaluated preattentively by
a subcortical circuit involving the amygdala; and second, stimuli
deemed emotionally signiﬁcant are given priority in the competi-
tion for access to selective attention. This process involves bottom-
up inputs from the amygdala as well as top-down inﬂuences from
frontal lobe regions involved in goal setting andmaintaining repre-
sentations in working memory”(Compton, 2003, p. 2115). To me
this suggests why a study of inattention blindness might proﬁt by
including the impact of emotional as opposed to neutral kinds of
stimuli. If so, it would appear that examples of art works that have
emotional impact uponviewerswill become increasingly pertinent
to scientiﬁc studies of attention.
CONSTRAINTS AND MODELS
In McMahon’s (2003) view, when normal perception occurs, our
attention is generally drawn to the literal meaning of a work.
But she explained that if the work exploits particular strategies,
it can draw our attention to focus on the phenomena themselves.
The example she offered was Pollock’s exploitation of the human
capacity to pick out fractal patterns. This helped me to under-
stand why many viewers could understand my intentions in my
exhibition. In my own artistic study of inattention blindness, by
exploiting the conﬂicts inherent in attention switching, the anima-
tion allowed viewers to experience the phenomenon directly and
then be able to reﬂect upon it.
The term “bottleneck” is often associated with attention,
emphasizing the physical limits of attention. What is the actual
nature of this limit? Does it involve shape at all (like a physical con-
straint)? If so, exactly what is constrained?According to Posner the
concept of constraint is a highly disputed idea about attentional
function. Some do not believe in any physical limit but just various
forms of interference. In an E-mail exchange (2011) Posner stated,
“I believe the executive system imposes a kind of limit because its
widespread connectivity produces a necessity for priority. Every
other kind of view (e.g., attenuators, channel capacity) has also
been suggested.” My own experience with staging a study of inat-
tention blindness was also ﬁlled with many constraints; not only
were there the constraints experienced by viewers, but there were
also spatial and time limits during the various exhibitions. What
became evident is that all learning proceeds within constraints.
This may reﬂect the fact that constraints force prioritizing to take
place if an action needs to be performed.
Computational models of inattention blindness have tried to
account for the many possibilities involved. The Block model of
an attention capture framework as discussed by Gu et al. (2005, p.
183) relies on the cooperation of an internally driven top-down
setting and external bottom-up input. The attentional set con-
sists of a pool of task prominent properties that are maintained
in memory. At any given moment only one object has a coher-
ence map that can receive focused attention, and it is designated
as the most compelling. This then drives a viewer’s gaze. The
“Contingent-Capture Hypothesis” relies on ﬁlters (Gu et al., 2005,
p. 185). According to Gu, the attentional set held by the subject
determines when an object receives attention. In addition, before
an object can be considered for attention, a transient orienting
response to the object must take place. This approach therefore
explains why the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object
increases with the object’s similarity to the currently attended
object.
According to Noë (2002), work on change blindness and inat-
tentional blindness in the psychology of scene perception has
provoked a new skepticism as evidenced by belief in “the grand
illusion,” which claims that the richness of our visual world is
an illusion. Noë has pointed out that failure to notice change is
a pervasive feature of our visual lives. Many of those who have
investigated change blindness support the grand illusion hypoth-
esis that the richness and presence of the world are illusions.
Noë counters this attitude by pointing out that we are sometimes
perceptually aware of unattended detail (amodal perception). He
provides the example of our perception of solidity when expe-
riencing a tomato as three-dimensional and round, even though
you only see its facing side (O’Regan and Noë, 2001). He has con-
cluded that the sensorimotor account can explain experience not
represented in our brains. According to O’Regan and Noë (2001),
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 174 | 12
Levy Art and inattention blindness
mastering sensorimotor contingencies generates our conscious
visual experiences. These considerations are important to artists
who tend to embed abstract concepts in the sensuality of theworld.
This is yet another reason that scientists might wish to further
consider how the artistic staging of tasks that are rooted in salient,
sensuous situations has affected the perception of viewers as com-
pared with analogous tasks in scientiﬁc experiments that lack such
embodiment.
CONCLUSION
Accumulated evidence has shown that attention can be trained.
The additional question explored was art’s potential to serve as
an attentional training ground, examining art in the context of
learning and motivation. This paper analyzed inattention blind-
ness within the context of a gallery exhibition and compared it to
scientiﬁc work on inattention blindness. “Looking” was explored
under more natural circumstances as opposed to laboratory con-
ditions. It also discussed how a top-down attentional set can
determine which stimuli are processed to the point of recogni-
tion. My ﬁndings were that the attentional set could be changed
by some viewers by careful looking and reﬂection upon the targets
depicted in various settings. The fact that so many viewers could
re-direct their attention to locate the target after going through
the entire gallery installation was, to me, suggestive that learn-
ing had taken place; they could now compare the images of the
targets they had viewed in static displays to the targets in the
Flash animation. I concluded that art enhances mental ﬂexibil-
ity and the viewer’s ability to identify the underlying content of an
artwork.
Scientists have recently explored how emotional salience can
inﬂuence attention. Although there is increasingly methodologi-
cal overlap between some scientiﬁc and artistic tests of attention,
artworks invariably stresses the social andmetaphoric dimensions,
calling forth memories and associations that might lead to a more
impassioned response on the part of the viewer. Images assume
an emotional resonance, which is quite different from traditional
cognitive science, which deemphasizes emotion, motivation, and
context (Kenrick, 2001). Much art can be justly characterized by
(1) a refusal to compartmentalize feelings from cognition and
(2) assigning high value to subjective experience and social and
political context. These are issues of increasing importance to
neuroscientists.
A kind of coding is apparent to those versed in art’s history.
Science similarly has its own history and methods, which must be
learned by artists who want to contribute their expertise to sci-
entists. Just as scientists can greatly expand upon their reservoir
of images, artists can also beneﬁt from looking at the variety of
methods scientists use to represent structures that they cannot
see and introduce different kinds of approaches to their installa-
tions.Attention cannot be owned by a single discipline like science
since it is essential to most others, particularly art. Therefore both
ﬁelds derive beneﬁt from sharing their information, but this can
only take place if bridges between them are erected and discourses
opened that go deep into analysis.
It seems to me that by reverse logic the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Card test supports the hypothesis that art has potential to train
attention. This test identiﬁes precisely those features some indi-
viduals do not have – the ability to discriminate among categories
and identify artistic intentionality. These are the very qualities that
art could likely promote. My own experience with testing inatten-
tion blindness suggests that these are abilities that, when engaged
by a viewer, art may be capable of enhancing.
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